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Abstract  
This paper considers economic cycles that do not depend on the exogenous economic 
actions. More precisely, the paper develops a positive model of government behavior 
in order to define the intertemporal fiscal policies that are optimal for a country, 
determining the optimal level of the budget and the optimal level of the rate of 
environmental quality, as well. For this purpose, we setup an optimal control model 
involving the intertemporal subsidy strategies for an authoritarian (like a central 
European) government. It will be shown - applying the Hopf bifurcation theorem - 
that cyclical strategy, i.e. waves of regulation, environmental subsidies alternating 
with deregulation, cuts in social programmes, etc., may be optimal strategies. In this 
paper we propose an extremely simple optimal control model concerning budget 
surplus and environmental subsidies. We investigate the cyclical subsiding policies 
applying one bifurcation theorem. A number of propositions are stated during the 
solution process.  
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1. Introduction  
In the last decades, a considerable bulk of the literature about economic 
business cycles is shifted on environmental resources in order to explain why and 
when the political decisions they are set many crucial economic variables in cyclical 
trajectories. A very simple argument could be the following. The evaluation of the 
environmental quality (made by the citizens) depends on pollution and abatement 
measures at a given instant of time. A farsighted regulator may exploit several such 
evaluations and run a program which is based on the tradeoff between subsidies 
devoted to abatement and budget in an optimal way. The literature on this field is fast 
growing and among others we refer to the studies of Feichtinger and Novak (1991), 
Semmler and Sieveking (2000), Fodha and Seegmueller (2012) and so on. 
Moreover, the size of the budget deficits (and the resulting public debt) it is a 
point of concern in the most developed western countries, including European 
countries, USA, Japan and so on. As a result of the growing and continuously public 
deficits is the sharp reduction of the economic activities under the fear of inflation and 
depreciation. But the major concern of the above reduction would be the uncertainty 
of the public debt unsustainability. On the other hand, the environmental quality 
programs, mainly based on subsidies, are often constrained by long-term fiscal 
objectives which impose to control public deficits. 
The search for financing mechanisms that do not increase debt burden has 
renewed interest in debt-for-nature swaps. Therefore, countries with debt reduce their 
debt burden and free up budgetary resources for environmental spending (Fodha and 
Seegmuller, 2014). 
In this paper we setup an optimal control model for which the rate of 
environmental quality is maximized. The maximization program takes place under the 
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constraint of budget surpluses (or deficits) accumulation which in turn is a crucial 
index for the nation primary surpluses. The budget surplus accumulation is also 
dependent on the opportunity cost of capital and on the cost of subsidies given in 
order to improve environmental quality. A second constraint that appears in the 
maximization process is also the most recently approved subsidies which are a 
measure of the instantaneous change of the overall subsidies. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the proposed model 
while section 3 discusses stability analysis for the same model. Section 4 gives an 
example with specific function forms of the model and section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The model (the rate of environmental quality is maximized) 
The objective of the benevolent social planner is to maximize an intertemporal 
environmental quality because a higher quality offers amenities to the people, 
therefore it is an extra reason to improve his intentions of a good policy. 
We denote by  E t  the current approval rate of environmental quality at a given time 
instant therefore the (simplified) problem of the regulator would be: 
 
0
max te E t dt

      1   
The rate of environmental quality, variable  E t , hinges on the budget surplus or 
deficit  B t  , on the total subsidies  S t  and finally on the most recently approved 
 t  , therefore it is rather a function of the form  , ,E E B S  . 
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The objective  1  implies a utility w.r.t . the good environmental quality, i.e. a 
utility index1 of the form     , , , ,u B S u E B S   , with the standard concave 
assumptions for the rate of environmental quality  
0,   0,   0,   0,  0,  0S SS B BBE E E E E E         2  
Subsidies, the variable S , are offered or burden (in the case of taxes – negative 
subsidy) in chronological order therefore the variable  S  is rather a result of historical 
adjustments, i.e. its evolution may be a sticky process. The addition of a new subsidy 
in the evaluation of the environmental quality acts more effective than the formerly 
taken, while a negative subsidy e.g. abolishing an existing pollution abatement 
process, will have negative results in environmental quality. The above particular 
types of environmental benefits and its non linearity  0SSE   it is enough to ensure 
interior solutions of the maximization problem  1 , instead of the unwished bang – 
bang type solutions. 
Regarding budget deficits there at least two reasons that they affect negatively 
the environmental quality. First, environmental quality may suffer from budget 
deficits because with a nonbalanced budget it is impossible the government to pay for 
environmental subsidies. The general rule in the classical economic literature is 
“running a deficit was considered an immoral by the public so the regulators at that 
time transgressed this norm with great peril” (Mueller, 1989). Second, the supposition 
of the variable E  rather as a utility instead of environmental quality gives the possible 
interpretation: the surpluses in budget gives to the social regulator the ability to 
                                                             
1 One model for which the utility index is maximized discussed in another paper 
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engage in prestigious environmental projects or to augment pollution abatement 
without the necessity to increase taxes2. 
Finally the regulator has to solve the following optimal control problem 
 
0
max , ,                       te E B S dt



     3   
 subject   to                  dB dt B rB C S  
 
 4
  
and                                            dS dt S      5   
with control (strategic) variable the variable   which is equivalent to the decision to 
offer or abolish subsidy, a decision which is highly depended on the budget 
constraint.  
The variable S  represents the amount of total subsidies received. The function 
 C S  is the cost function associated with the financial burden of the subsidies and it 
is supposed in the convex fashion, i.e.    0,  0,  0 0,  0 1C C C C       . 
Moreover, it is worth to mention that may be a deadweight loss in the case that the 
social cost  C S  exceed the amount S of the subsidy payment, i.e. in the case 
 C S S . The additional expenses that may create the above divergence  C S S  
are called by Becker “deadweight costs” (Becker, 1983) and could be e.g. a 
disincentive effect or the costs associated with the expansion of institutions in order to 
manage subsidy payments. 
It is worth noting that for small amount of subsidies there is no deadweight 
costs, i.e. for 0S  implies  C S S , due to the assumption  0 1C    . Moreover, 
due to the convexity assumption of the cost function, for 0S   implied  C S S  
                                                             
2 For more information on cost differential and optimal abatement of air pollution see Halkos (1993, 
1994, 1996) while for fiscal spending and environmental quality see Halkos and Paizanos (2016a,b,c; 
2017) and for controlling polluting firms see Halkos and Papageorgiou 2014, 2016, 2017, 2018). 
 6 
meaning that with increased subsidies the deadweight costs increases. The latter 
convexity effect could be justified first by the presence of many pressure groups and 
therefore, due to the competition amongst the groups, the proposals with lower costs 
win, and second by the disincentive effect caused the transfer payments. 
Another parameter of the model, the interest rate r , is earned on budget 
surpluses while is paid in the case of deficits, and moreover it is assumed lower than 
the discount rate of social planner, i.e. r . 
In the model under consideration, it was made the simplified assumption that 
all the taxes are ear marked for the provision of public goods. This fact is due to the 
equation (4) which, in turn, implies that all the taxes and expenses provide public 
goods and moreover they are balanced, therefore simplifying our arguments.  
We proceed with the solution analysis of the optimal control problem (3) – (5) 
in the usual way. The necessary and sufficient conditions are summarized below 
 H E rB C            6   
H E            7   
  BE             8   
SC E            9   
   lim 0te t B t



        10   
   lim 0te t S t



        11   
While the stationary solution of the states and costates follows form the 
solution of the system below 
 B C S r         12   
 BE r           13   
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   S Br E E C r                   14   
0          15   
 , ,0E B S          16   
In the next section we consider the stability analysis of the solution strategy. 
 
3. Stability analysis 
For the solution purposes we assume that there exists an interior solution for 
the optimal policy  , ,E B S  , which is ensured by the boundary conditions. 
According to Pontryagin’s maximum principle we solve equation 0H  with respect 
to the control variable   i.e.,  , ,B S    . The so called canonical system of 
equations in  , , ,B S    is produced by substitutions into the differential equations of 
the state and costate variables.  
The main question of the entire study hinges upon whether the optimal 
equilibrium strategy is cyclical, stable or unstable, while the cyclicality is 
characterized in the sense of stable limit cycles according to Wirl (1992). The two 
major tools of limit cycles analysis are first the Hopf bifurcation theorem which 
requires the  analytical expressions of the eigenvalues of the linear approximation of 
the above canonical system of equations and second a theorem founded by the 
economist Dockner (1985) which allows the explicit calculation of the latter 
eigenvalues. 
Therefore, we calculate the Jacobian matrix for equations    12 16 and in the 
next step we compute the eigenvalues, according to Dockner’s formula (Dockner, 
1985). The Jacobian matrix will be 
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2
2
0 0
1
0SB
BS B SBB B B
BS S B SS S SB
r C
EE
E E E
J E E E EE E E E
r
E E E
E E E E E E E EE C
C
E E r E

  
    
  
     
  


                        
  17   
According to Dockner’s theorem (Dockner, 1985) the four eigenvalues of the 
canonical equations   12 16  would be  2 21 1 1 11,2,3,4 2 2 2 2 4e K K J        
where: 
2
B BS SB B
SSBK
SB S

    
 
   
     
    
    
   
    
  
therefore, the determinant  of the Jacobian (17) is the following 
  2 22BB BS SS BS SS B S BE C E C r E r E C E r E C r r E r E C
J
E
 

                       18   
while coefficient K  is 
    2B SS S BE C r E E E CK r r
E E
 
 
 

             19  
Applying Dockner’s theorem (Dockner, 1985) the eigenvalues are given by 
 2 21 1 1 11,2,3,4 2 2 2 2 4e K K J           20   
In order to simplify the analysis that follows we assume that the function that 
represents the rate of environmental quality  , ,E B S   is additive, which implies that 
its crossed derivatives are vanish. Moreover we assume linear dependence with 
respect to the variable which represents subsidies S  implying that the second 
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derivative of the same rate function vanishes, i.e. 0SSE   . Finally, after the above 
simplifications, the expressions  18  and  19  reduce into 
2
BB BE C E C r
J
E
          21  
   
BE CK r r
r E
 
         22  
Since we interested to facilitate cyclical strategies, we choose from the 
equilibrium properties, as these proposed by Dockner and Feichtinger (1991), the 
appropriate case3. This case entails two purely imaginary eigenvalues of the Jacobian 
J  , which corresponds to the following conditions:  
 212J K        .1C     
 2 21 12 2 0J K K       .2C   
Therefore, in order to apply the Hopf bifurcation theorem the necessary 
conditions are 0J   and 0K   . Further inspection of the crucial variables ,  J K , 
for the interesting case which favors cyclical strategies, reveals that the second order 
partial derivative of environmental quality w.r.t. budget BBE  must be sufficient 
negative, while the same first derivative BE  and the first derivative of the cost 
function C   must be small enough, the inequality r  as well must hold and the 
absolute value  E  must be large. These algebraic conditions have the following 
economic sense.  
 
                                                             
3 Another one case is, according to Dockner and Feichtinger (1991), the case at which the saddle point 
stability with two real roots is encountered, but here is out of interest, and the inequalities that satisfied 
in that case are respectively:  2120 ,   0J K K     
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Proposition 1. 
The economic cyclical strategies for the proposed model (3) (5)  are feasible if 
the following conditions are met: 
(a) The subsidy programs produces low deadweight costs (i.e. 0C    ) 
(b) There exists sufficient concavity of the evaluation of budget surpluses 
( 0BBE   ) 
(c) A strong concavity of the rate of environmental quality with respect to most 
recent subsidy concessions, which means that the marginal gain of 
environmental quality from granting an additional euro declines rapidly with 
respect to the concessions; or conversely any substantial deregulation bears 
large costs in environmental quality, are favorable for those conditions that are 
necessary for cyclical policies. 
  Therefore, an efficient rent seeking process favors cyclical strategies. To see 
that we choose the bifurcation point E

 by solving equation  .2C  also taking into 
account the simplified versions  21  and  22   
    2
4
2
BBEE
r r r r
   
      

     23   
The resulting value of the bifurcation parameter 23  suggests that for a small 
discount rate    r   satisfies equality  .2C  for large E . Therefore, the 
assumptions based on highly discounted rates are not necessary to do, but these 
assumptions are helpful in explaining the cyclical policies. 
Finally regarding stability, it is worth noting that further motions from the 
bifurcation point leads, according to Dockner and Feichtinger (1991), to complete 
instability of the canonical system of equations, which is not welcomed.  
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Furthermore, it is worth noting that the above analysis is restricted in the 
obvious case at which the Hamiltonian function  6  is maximized. This in turn 
implies that the restriction r  is crucial for the concavity of the Hamiltonian (and 
therefore for its maximization). Technically speaking in the case  at r , according 
to  13   the costate variable   changes its sign, at the steady states, below to zero, i.e. 
0   , which in turn violates the concavity of the Hamiltonian function and 
therefore the maximization condition becomes invalid. Moreover no stationary 
environmental policy   , ,E B S   exists which satisfies solution  16  and concavity 
conditions  2  simultaneously. The latter, because 0  ,  implies 0   which 
contradicts condition 0E  . The next proposition summarizes in economic terms the 
above discussion.  
 
Proposition 2 
In the case the discount rate   of the regulator is below the opportunity cost of capital 
r the optimal policy boils down to tax today in order to accumulate budget surpluses 
which allow larger subsidies in the future.  
 
4. Cyclical policies (an example) 
The following paradigm is an application of the above proposed model with 
specific functional forms of functions involved. For this purpose we consider the form 
of the function of the rate of environmental quality 
    210 0 min 2, ,E B S a S b B B            24  
with the following parameters 0 0 min0,   0,   0 1,   0,   0a b B          
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and the cost function associated with the financial burden of the subsidies in the 
following convex form 
  212C S S kS   , 0k       25  
The specification  24  only represents a weighted average of the individual 
contributions to E , moreover we suppose that the weight from the rate of 
environmental quality bonus with respect to most recently approved subsidies   is set 
to one (1) at equilibrium. Therefore, at the equilibrium, condition  16  implies 
1E   , since 0  . In the same specification  24  the weights 0 0,  a b  
determine whether a surplus or a deficit describe the stationary solution. The 
parameter  minB  shows how budget surpluses and deficits are appreciated, and the 
superscript   , at which the amount  minB B  has been raised, constrains budget 
deficits to minB B  . 
The application of equation (22)  in the parameters of our example reveals that 
the parameter E   is the first candidate choice as the bifurcation parameter since 
this choice satisfies the condition 0K   and moreover the same choice doesn’t affect 
the equilibrium position. According to Dockner and Feichtinger (Dockner and 
Feichtinger, 1991), the choice of  , as the bifurcation parameter, implies that we vary 
  until the bifurcation curve  2 21 12 2J K K   is crossed, which is possible with 
the above specifications. 
Let us consider the parameters 0 0 min1,  50,  1,  a b B    1,  0, 2     and 
0,1  . With these parameter values the model admits an equilibrium with budget 
surplus 2,57B   which in turn facilitates equilibrium subsidies 0,51S   . 
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Lowering the value of the parameter 0b  leads in a deficit of the national budget 
therefore in turn could lead in taxation (negative subsidy) as the equilibrium strategy.  
For   small the system of canonical equations exhibit saddle point stability, but the 
bifurcation curve is crossed at point ˆ 4,793   as numerical calculations confirm 
(Hassard et al, 1981). In the above point a stable limit cycle is born, therefore a family 
of stable cyclical strategies exists for smaller values of   but sufficiently close to 
4,793 , i.e. for 4,793 . 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we setup a very simple optimal control model for which the main 
concern of the central regulator was to steer the undertaken subsidy’s decision to its 
target, in an optimal way, but under the constraint of the national budget. For this 
purpose we treat the overall subsidies offered as an accumulated variable. In this 
accumulated variable, the instant changes about the given subsidy they are added onto 
the historically already offered, constituting therefore the overall subsidy.  
The above treatment of the subsidies is similar to the case of consumption 
behavior. According to Becker and Murphy (1988) a wide variety of consumer 
behavior is consistent with utility maximization. In the same framework of Becker 
and Murphy enters the addictive behavior of the consumers as a characteristic at 
which an increase in the past consumption causes present consumption to rise.  
Since consumption includes all the goods without constraints we enlarge the 
above behavior in the case of the subsidies, assuming the subsidies as consumption 
goods. Moreover, the past subsidies offered is summarized by a stock of subsidies 
that, together with current subsidy, affects current utility. This definition implicitly 
assumes that subsidies accumulate a single stock (subsidies capital). The latter is the 
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simplest case in literature, the one capital accumulation, but there are more complex 
cases of two and more capital accumulations.  
In our note we explain the causes for the occurrence of cyclical subsidies 
trajectories. We show that, for the case of subsidy consumption capital, subsidies 
trajectories will always be monotonic. Hence, cyclical subsidies paths expressed as 
stable limit cycles or damped (explosive) oscillations require a subsidy that 
accumulates at least two stocks. It is the interaction of these two stocks that causes 
irregular behavior. In the main result of the paper (Proposition 1) we show that if 
present subsidy offered is positively correlated with past subsidies but is negatively 
correlated with the other stock (i.e. the national budget stock) then cyclical subsidies 
patterns are possible.  
This implies that the cyclical policies of subsidies require two counter–
balancing effects: the consuming and the satiating one. The first force acts like an 
addictive force which causes the current subsidies consumption to increase as past 
subsidies accumulate, while the second force causing current subsidies consumption 
to decline because of its costs. 
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